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Article 
From Aristotle to Arendt: A phenomenological exploration of 
forms of knowledge and practice in the context of child 
protection social work in the UK. 
Abstract 
This paper attempts to explore the relationship between different forms of knowledge and the 
kinds of activity that arise from them within child protection social work practice. The argument 
that social work is more than either ‘science’ or ‘art’ but distinctly ‘practice’ is put through a 
historical description of the development of Aristotle’s views of the forms of knowledge and 
Hannah Arendt’s later conceptualisations as detailed in The Human Condition (1958). The paper 
supports Arendt’s privileging of Praxis over Theoria within social work and further draws upon 
Arendt’s distinctions between Labour, Work and Action to delineate between different forms of 
social work activity. The author highlights dangers in social work relying too heavily on technical 
knowledge and the use of theory as a tool in seeking to understand and engage with the people it 
serves and stresses the importance of a phenomenological approach to research and practice as a 
valid, embodied form of knowledge. The argument further explores the constructions of service 
users that potentially arise from different forms of social work activity and cautions against over-
prescriptive use of ‘outcomes’ based practice that may reduce the people who use services to 
products or consumables. The author concludes that social work action inevitably involves trying 
to understand humans in a complex and dynamic way that requires engagement and to seek new 
meanings for individual humans. 
Keywords: Arendt; Aristotle; Phenomenology: Child Protection; Social Work; Theory; Praxis. 
 
Introduction 
“Social Workers fulfill one of the most difficult tasks for the community. 
They need to have detailed knowledge of the disciplines of psychology, 
sociology, social administration, human growth and development, research 
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methods and the law, and to maintain a nice balance between compassion 
and realism, empowerment and control. They need to be aware of their own 
needs and prejudices and have the strength to ensure that these do not 
impact upon their work. They deal with those who are rejected by society…it 
is hardly surprising that they do not always get it absolutely right” (Lord 
Low of Dalston 18.1.07 taken from Hansard) 
 
Social Work has always looked outside itself for theoretical inspiration but the 
danger of spreading itself so thinly across so many understandings of the human 
condition is that it often imports perspectives that it then doesn’t have the depth 
to deal with in a sufficiently nuanced way to understand and describe the very 
complex lives of its users. Set this danger within a hotly contested political 
context that reduces social work to “…a very narrow concern with child 
protection” (Parton, 2014, p. 2042) and is regularly re-shaped by media frenzies 
around tragedies such as befell Victoria Climbié, Peter Connelly and others and 
stoked by the Risk Society (Beck, 1992); and what you have is a profession 
unsure of its remit, unable to grasp a coherent knowledge base and struggling to 
develop a professional identity. It seems important therefore to try to root those 
practices in a wider examination of what it is to be human within society in order 
to inform the judgements and decisions we make about the value and worth of 
childhood, family and community. 
 
Social work academics set fortifications around their theoretical camps: 
psychological versus sociological; positivist versus hermeneutic; critical 
theorists versus the apolitical (e.g. Narey, 2014). The nineties saw a widespread 
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acceptance of the radical mantra of anti-oppressive practice (AOP) based in 
Marxian, structuralist understandings that employed catch-22 like phrases such 
as “If you’re not part of the solution, you’re part of the problem” (Thompson, 
1992, cited in Beckett and Maynard, 2005).  This was hard to challenge or to 
contextualise for who would not agree that we ought to be against oppression 
and injustice? While AOP as a ‘practice theory’ seems to be in decline the social 
work literature still proffers a range of theoretical understandings that recognise 
the political nature of social work in general (Garrett, 2009) and child protection 
in particular (Parton, 2014) for how can we intervene as agents of the state in 
family life without recognising that as a political act? However, while we stand 
on the deck saluting the flag of social justice we have been scuttling ourselves 
with neo-liberal technical approaches to practice (Garrett, 2009) and, I would 
argue, epistemically sinking. The quest for certainty so that it ‘…will never 
happen again’ leads us to clutch at performance management straws that 
inevitably give way when it does happen again.  
 
Surely then our appropriation of attachment theory and its growing evidence 
base within neuropathology would provide us with safer ground. Yet again we 
clutch enthusiastically to certainty in the modern project. With a few notable 
exceptions (Munro & Musholt, 2014; Wastell and White, 2012; Featherstone et al, 
2014) we watch as the next generation of social workers suffer the consequences 
of intellectual inbreeding, fumbling through practice with webbed theories and 
six-fingered methodologies that give up on families unable to reach the optimal 
state of a ‘secure pattern’ attachment with their child. 
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These two extremes of practice are vital to our understanding of the complex 
worlds that our service users and ourselves inhabit but while we wait for the 
battle between macro and micro to burn itself out, we seem to have lost the 
ability to engage on the meso level. Yet here lies the social – the points that 
validate our position as social workers – what Goffman (Lemert & Branaman, 
1997) called the Interaction Order. These are the points that individuals interact 
with their environments. Social Work seems to have lost its capacity to focus on 
the social through its self-righteous determination to safeguard individuals from 
their families, leading to calls from authors to separate child protection from 
social work (Parton, 2014) and, I would argue, more ethical calls to ‘re-imagine’ 
child protection work as family, rather than child, centred (Featherstone et al, 
2014). I offer this paper as a contribution to addressing some of the fundamental 
ways of thinking about what child protection social workers do by addressing 
ways of knowing. In doing this I will be unashamedly claiming phenomenology as 
a legitimate approach to understanding social work as both practice and 
research methodology. If we are, as Croisdale-Appleby (2014) recommends, to 
produce social workers as practitioners, professionals and social scientists then 
we need to embrace an approach that enables all three. One could argue that we 
are in fact in a state that Kuhn describes as ‘essential tension’ in that the world of 
child protection we currently inhabit is ‘out of joint’ with any one of the 
knowledge traditions we draw upon. Kuhn might view the current state of social 
work knowledge as being in a crisis in which ‘epistemological counter-instances’ 
are leading us toward the emergence of a new and different analysis. (Kuhn, 
1996, p.78) 
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What we find are syntheses and appropriations of thought from other disciplines 
being applied with varying degrees of success such as Hayes & Houston’s (2007) 
use of Habermas in combining critical theory with Schutz’s phenomenology as a 
way of theorizing child protection. It is also easy to agree with Garrett (2007) 
that social work’s chief theoretical and practical preoccupations could orientate 
the profession in the direction of Bourdieu who specifically sets out to develop a 
theory of practice for sociological research. We are beginning to see more use of 
phenomenology within research (Smeeton & Boxall, 2011, Nordberg, 2014, 
Gibson, 2014) as well as ethnomethodological work that has had significant 
impact upon practice (Broadhurst et al, 2010). While Bourdieu (1977) viewed 
ethnomethodology as the currently active form of phenomenology, Tesch (1994, 
cited in Gray, 2014) distinguishes between phenomenological research and 
ethnography. Both are based upon description and interpretation but 
ethnographic research is focused more on culture while phenomenology 
concerns itself with the human experience of the ‘life-world’. Phenomenology’s 
focus then is on individuals’ ‘lived experiences’ while ethnographers make use of 
‘sites’.  Although Arendt (1906–1975) only occasionally characterized herself as 
a phenomenologist (Moran, 2000) and is a glaring omission from some textbooks 
(e.g. Dreyfus & Wrathall, 2009) many of her arguments come from her time as 
Heidegger’s student (Inwood, 1997) and her subsequent reworking of some of 
his thought. Her belief that we should not consider humanity to have an essential 
nature but a certain condition, which is only permanent in as much as it 
conditions and is conditioned by everything with which it comes into contact 
(Arendt, 1958, p9-10) clearly sets her as a phenomenologist. Arendt argues that 
this phenomenal nature of the world appears differently to each person (Kattago, 
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2014). One of her key points is that men and not man (sic) inhabit the world and 
we have to think of the human condition as plural and not a fixed state that 
applies to all. Villa (1996, p.24-5) points out the resonances between Arendt’s 
work and that of Weber, Adorno and Foucault in making the point that society 
excludes the possibility of action by absorbing the public realm and emasculating 
plurality.  Humanity for Arendt is plural and we are always therefore dealing 
with individual humans, not with abstract ‘humanity’. This seems to me to be in 
perfect accord with a view of social work that seeks to make sense of the lived 
experiences of individuals and it is surprising that phenomenology is rarely 
articulated in its literature. 
 
The social work literature is however, peppered with hand-wringing about the 
disconnect between theory and practice and whether social work is ‘art’ or 
‘science’ (e.g. Gitterman & White, 2013, Cash, 2001, Hudson, 2009, Trinder, 
1996). By drawing upon Hannah Arendt’s reworking of Aristotle’s Intellectual 
Virtues, I intend to describe different forms of knowledge and the activity that 
flows from each in relation to child protection social work and the related 
construction of the ‘service user’ that follows. In doing so I intend to argue that 
social work needs to recognise what aspects of itself are ‘art’ and which ‘science’ 
but ultimately to claim itself as distinctly ‘practice’. 
 
“The knowledge that social work seeks cannot be made in universities by 
individuals who presumptively seek timeless, context-less truths about human 
nature, societies, institutions and policy. The knowledge must be developed in 
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the living situations that are confronted by the contemporary episodes in the 
field…” (Rein & White, 1981, p.37) 
 
 
Aristotle 
 
In The Nichomachean Ethics (2009 edition) Aristotle (384-322 BC) set out the 
beginnings of the contest highlighted above in that he divided the world into 
things that change and things that do not which led him to distinguish between 
two main branches of knowledge. Aristotle described the knowledge of the 
unchanging as theoria and knowledge of what changes as praxis, which includes 
knowledge of things done, or poeisis, knowledge of things made. His argument 
that intellect of itself moves nothing is apposite in this discussion because social 
work is by its very nature ‘action’. We must therefore try to understand the 
interplay between Theoria, Poeisis and Praxis and explore the further sub-
divisions. 
 
Theoria – Aristotle described scientific knowledge as proceeding through both 
induction (nous) and deduction (epistêmê). Together these constitute wisdom 
(sophia).  He defines scientific knowledge as ‘judgement about things that are 
universal and necessary’ (Aristotle, 2009, p.107) and therefore unchanging. 
The academy concerns itself with this form of knowledge and theory is therefore 
afforded primacy. Much comment then is on why the practitioner is failing to use 
the knowledge provided to it (Marsh and Fisher, 2008) However, Aristotle 
himself, while privileging this form of knowledge over others, said that it ends in 
8 
 
contemplation and produces no human action. (Dreyfus and Wrathall, 2009. 
Aristotle, 2009) Social work is concerned precisely with human action in a 
constantly changing social and political context so the use of theory or scientific 
knowledge is by its nature likely to have limited application.  
 
Poeisis  - Aristotle separated ‘things made’ from ‘things done’ and articulated a 
form of knowledge of production as art. To be engaged in production a technical 
knowledge (technê) is required. It seems to me that the recent neoliberal techno-
rationalist emphasis on individual outcomes for social work users requires 
knowledge of production. Performance indicators therefore have mistakenly 
sought to measure social work as a productive profession, rather than as an 
active one (Broadhurst et al 2010, White et al 2008). Knowledge here has 
emphasised the counting of social work ‘outcomes’, e.g. the number of children 
subject to a safeguarding plan, proportion of children brought into care or 
subject to proceedings, length of time within which assessments are completed 
etc. A little thought around this would question whether there are ever outputs 
for social work activity and at what stage they are measurable? Understanding 
social work as being concerned with children’s welfare, by which I mean the total 
state of being well, rather than the presence or otherwise of risk factors makes 
knowledge derived from social work products problematic.  
 
Praxis – according to Aristotle this derives from activity that is not about 
producing something and requires phronêsis (prudence) or knowledge of how to 
act in particular situations rather than the application of general principles. He 
argued that it is phronêsis that guides action (2009). Aristotle describes the need 
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for practical knowledge in understanding the variables that aren’t demonstrable 
by science. He argues that practical wisdom cannot be science or art but a true 
and reasoned capacity to act with things that are good or bad for man. Aristotle 
goes on to argue that within practical wisdom there cannot be ‘excellence’ 
because it is a virtue and not an art. Rorty (p 343) suggests Aristotle felt 
contemplative and practical lives “…provide the conditions for one another's 
fullest development”. However, he clearly privileged theoretical over practical 
knowledge. 
 
Arendt 
 
There is little dispute within the literature (Higgins, 2011, Hayden, 2014, Villa, 
1996) that Arendt is fundamentally an Aristotelian but her refinement breathes 
fresh life into his ideas. In The Human Condition (1958) Arendt challenges 
Aristotle’s view that theoria is a superior form of knowledge and instead 
privileges praxis. The Human Condition is ambitious in its scope and within it 
Arendt seeks to explain how she develops Aristotle’s themes and distinctions 
between different forms of knowledge and how these relate to human activity. In 
the first part, Arendt sets out the bones of her discussion by introducing the 
distinction between the active life (vita activa) and the contemplative life (vita 
contemplativa).  It is here she first asserts her separation from Aristotle in her 
privileging of the active life over the contemplative. She positions herself as 
believing that there is no essential human nature – only a certain condition and 
that in order to be fully human men need to fully engage in political action with 
each other. 
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“Action alone is the exclusive prerogative of man; neither a beast nor a 
god is capable of it and only action is entirely dependent upon the 
constant presence of others.” (Arendt, 1958 p.22-23) 
 
According to Higgins (2011, p.91) she contends that as the contemplative life rose 
in the estimation of late antiquity, the active life came to be understood as 
opposite – i.e. non-contemplative life, which blurred the distinctions within it, 
cleaving theory and practice. By the time the active life regained pride of place in 
early modernity, mainly through the stress that Marx placed on the primacy of 
labour, its internal hierarchy had been reversed and its values distorted. 
 
The contemplative life 
 
Arendt then is at pains to re-establish clear distinctions between the 
contemplative life and the active life but to offer a more thorough description 
and analysis of the types of activity humans engage in within society. Arendt was 
definitely not anti-theoretical but she was clear as to its place. She invites us to 
view theory as “not a tool but a region of thought” (Vasquez, 2006, p.44), which I 
would argue is a useful way to approach theory within social work. When we 
adopt theories as tools they tend to become sledgehammers rather than 
electron-microscopes and minimize our potential for thoughtful reflection and 
analysis.  
 
The active life 
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Arendt refines Aristotle by distinguishing between three domains within the 
active life: For Arendt, labour, work and action are all parts of human life but are 
hierarchical and in the end it is action that is the pinnacle of human activity, the 
sine qua non of leading a fully human life. (Higgins, 2011, p. 91) 
 
 Labour – is activity that is about maintenance of a state. Arendt argues 
against the Marxian idea that labour is man’s essence, that humanity 
creates itself through labour. For Arendt nothing is further from the truth. 
She pointedly describes much of active life as Labour, which, in marked 
contrast to Marx, she sees has having no inherent human worth. While it 
is necessary to sustain life, it is simply all the activity that men undertake 
to maintain the status quo: growing food that is eaten, cleaning 
workspaces etc. For something to possess value it must possess durability 
– labour only produces consumables and leaves nothing behind. The 
result of the effort is almost as quickly consumed as the effort is spent. 
(Villa, 1996, p.26) She saw increasing automation in the workplace as 
producing a society of labourers. 
 Work –in contrast to labour is a distinctly human activity that equates 
most closely with Aristotle’s description of poeisis – a knowledge of how 
to make things - or ‘art’. The distinguishing characteristic of work is its 
purposiveness; all work aims at the creation of a durable and lasting 
product, and so possesses directionality, a teleological quality utterly 
absent from labour. Work destroys nature through its creation of 
artefacts. The products of work ‘reifications’ do not find their way back 
12 
 
into the cycle of natural growth and decay but endure outside it. In work, 
men are artisans and artists who create products. However, Arendt 
argued that the products that work adds to the world also give rise to 
labour. (Higgins, 2011) Arendt sees technology and the consumer society 
as ultimately devaluing work. If what is created is only to be consumed 
and ends up back in the cycle of decay, the activity of creating it is labour. 
What is left is not a society of workers exercising a craft but a society of 
labourers who consider whatever they do primarily as a way to sustain 
their own lives and those of their families. The transformation of the 
whole society into a labouring society permeates human existence with a 
necessity and sameness – humanity – human beings as public actors, as 
unique individuals – is threatened with extinction. 
 
 Action - Arendt reserves the word action for only a small subset of the full 
variety of human doings and efforts – action is closely connected with 
‘speech’ for only man “…can communicate himself”. [There is future 
potential to explore the bridge that Arendt builds between Wittgenstein’s 
description of the linguistic turn and Habermas’ theory of  
“Communicative Action” (Habermas, 1977)]. She goes onto argue, that 
man can live without either labouring or working (you could pay 
someone to labour for you and choose not to produce anything durable) 
but that a life without speech and action has ceased to be a human life 
“…because it is no longer lived among men.” (sic) The truly human 
condition then, she argues, lies within a web of human relationships and it 
is what happens ‘in-between’ people, which is valuable. Arendt argued 
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that practical wisdom (phronêsis), the primary intellectual virtue of 
deliberation concerned with action, is not merely concerned with the 
selection of means, as is technê or art. Rather, in deliberating, the man of 
practical wisdom, the phronimos, is more concerned with finding what is 
good for himself and his fellow citizens. (Villa, 1996, p.32). This 
represents the highest sphere of human engagement especially in co-
operation and discussion. It is only in the life of action as opposed to 
abstract thought that humans become fully authentic and is the only 
realm where it is possible to achieve excellence. Action for Arendt must 
involve initiating a new beginning – natality (Arendt, 1958, p.9) What I 
find particularly exciting about Arendt’s discussion of action is the idea 
that human activity itself creates new beginnings. She steps away from 
Heidegger’s rather pessimistic focus on mortality by stressing natality. 
Humans acting together give birth to new ideas and understandings from 
within the already existing set of ideas and understandings from which 
they come and move them onwards. New stories are created through 
people acting together. One of the consequences of natality is that any 
new understanding is fleeting, for it will cause people within this web of 
relationships to think and behave in new ways, which in turn will cause 
others to have new understandings ad infinitum. There is no product as 
such but the human condition moves on. 
 
Application to child protection social work 
 
It is precisely this hopefulness in the capacity of humans to create new stories 
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that I believe offers healthy prospects for social work. Too often we try to tie 
people down as fitting within a certain category, conforming to a set of 
behaviours that we understand as relating to a particular essential condition. 
Once we have fixed this understanding we have a sense that we can ‘know’ what 
it is to be that person and how to work with them to either change their 
behaviour or situation or to recognise it as being beyond redemption. In recent 
years child protection social work has relied heavily upon attachment theory as 
first described by Bowlby and subsequent theorists (Howe et al, 1999; 
Shemmings & Shemmings, 2011). The idea that the nature of the relationship a 
child forms with their primary caregiver in the first few years of life sets their 
patterns of behaviours and relationships for the rest of their lives is an attractive 
yet potentially toxic one as it robs people of their potential for agency. Social 
workers stress the criticality of the early years and frequently see parents who 
had difficult childhoods themselves as therefore incapable of change. Social work 
interventions then seek to break the chain of insecure attachments often by 
removing children and placing them in new relationships with primary 
caregivers judged as being able to promote a secure attachment. Whilst this 
approach is beginning to gather a more critical appraisal (e.g. Wastell & White, 
2012) we need to have new understandings to challenge scientific determinism.  
 
I feel that Arendt can begin to inform this search by recognising that we can’t 
rely upon the simple application of high theory to very complex webs of 
relationships. Simply taking people through child protection processes is simply 
to subject them to social labour. Nor can we necessarily rely upon 
straightforward technical solutions to dynamic, uncertain, human issues, for as 
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soon as we have acted with people we have set off a new chain of meanings and 
understandings that that person will draw upon in acting in the world. We can’t 
therefore understand their lives as products of social work as those are fleeting. 
We have to engage with people in a form of social action, responding to their 
evolving condition and recognising the new understandings we are generating 
in-between us. 
 
Arendt invites us to try to understand each individual’s unique perspective on 
their own life and to avoid slipping into a belief that there is a fixed human 
nature that is essential and predictive. This is a phenomenological understanding 
of the human condition that recognises the potential for new beginnings. While 
there will always be child protection concerns so severe that we may not be able 
to safely allow parents to care for a particular child or children at this point in 
their lives, allowing ourselves to believe that people can change and may be able 
to successfully parent in the future is particularly important. As Broadhurst and 
Mason (2013) argue, casting women as ‘maternal outcasts’ subject to successive 
compulsory removals of their children raises many ethical, legal and practical 
challenges to social work practitioners. It is also extremely resource intensive 
and logjams child protection team caseloads and the family courts. 
 
Approaching service users as consistently capable of change also allows practice 
wisdom to be used in a positive direction towards keeping families together, 
solving problems, finding new ways to behave and creating new stories. This is 
inherently a more satisfactory and satisfying way to practice social work and 
also I would argue a more human way to live and practice – immersing ourselves 
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in action with our fellow human beings. We need to thus remove ourselves to a 
sufficient distance to recognize that some of what we do currently is not ‘action’ 
but ‘process’, which removes us from engagement with the people who use our 
services and to heed Arendt’s warning that: 
 
“It is quite conceivable that the modern age – which began with such an 
unprecedented and promising outburst of human activity – may end in 
the deadliest, most sterile passivity history has ever known.” (1958, 
p.322) 
 
To illustrate the difference between ‘action’ and ‘process’ we need look no 
further than the recommendations that flow from published serious case 
reviews intended to promote learning and improve practice.  Brandon et al 
(2011) conclude that many of the recommendations following a child death or 
serious injury result in a proliferation of tasks that add new layers of 
prescriptive activity and leave little room for professional judgment, or, I would 
also argue, concern.  Rather than strengthening supervision and supporting 
reflective practice, the tendency is to recommend more training for social 
workers and to create new or duplicate procedures. If we look at how these 
recommendations translate into what the social worker is expected to do we see 
processes laid out that stipulate how often children should be visited, who 
should be spoken to and how the visit should be recorded, rather than to ‘act’ 
with concern for the service user. 
 
“If a young person has been reported missing the allocated social worker 
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should undertake a statutory visit within three working days of the child’s 
return and must complete a missing exemplar, ‘Placement Information 
Record’ and importantly a return interview should be completed…. 
consideration should be given as to whether the placement meets the 
child’s needs” (Liverpool SCB Procedures Manual, updated August 2014.) 
 
While this clearly sets out a social worker’s duty to consider why a young person 
might have gone missing from care, it would be perfectly possible to comply with 
this procedure without the young person feeling that the social worker has any 
human concern for their well-being. Caring for children is reduced to Labour 
reliant upon procedures being followed and feeding the information system. This 
often leads to the compliance culture that Munro (2011) refers to in describing 
practitioners focused on ‘doing things right’ rather than ‘doing the right thing’. 
 
If we were to translate this into a piece of Work, the social worker might be 
advised that when a young person goes missing from care it is important for 
them to ensure the placement is able to keep the young person safe by working 
with them and the carer towards the goal (product) of a stable, secure placement.  
This requires poeisis in knowing how to work with the carer and young person to 
produce a stable placement and possibly technê in applying techniques to 
achieve that goal. 
 
 I would argue that a social worker’s Action, in the Arendtian sense of the word, 
when a young person is missing from care might include beginning the above 
guidance by requiring that the allocated social worker show concern for the 
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young person by acting to assure themselves that the child is now safe and well 
and that the young person has the opportunity to talk to them about why they 
went missing, any worries they might have and explore any potential harm they 
may have come to.  It is hard to proceduralise ‘concern’, but seating social work 
back into its Rogerian roots may lead it towards phronêsis.  
 
Arendt’s analysis shows that theory is displaced not by action but by work and 
ultimately labour – the ideal of fabrication gives new impetus to cognitive 
pursuits in the direction of natural science – in which knowing is intimately tied 
to making (Higgins, 2011). Thus even as work (whose products include tools) 
helps to lighten our labour, it creates a ‘second task of labouring’ in order to 
maintain the system. Recent innovation within child protection work is towards 
a series of approaches that rely heavily on such tools aimed at enabling 
engagement with service users which have to a large extent, been welcomed by 
the academic and practice communities with many local authorities adopting 
strengths-based approaches such as “Signs of Safety” (Turnell & Edwards, 1999; 
Munro 2011). While I also welcome coherent approaches to engaging with 
children and their families (Smeeton 2013a, 2013b) there is a real and present 
danger that social workers may rely only on their knowledge (technê) of the 
tools and their application and thus become ‘technicians’. The other danger is 
that practice may become measured not by the quality of the analysis but by the 
completion of the task and I have already heard of social workers criticized by 
managers for not having completed and placed a “Three Houses Tool” on a 
child’s record, even when the child was pre-lingual and the tool therefore 
inappropriate. Again, we reduce action to work to labour. Arendt (1958, p. 196) 
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claimed that “…interpretation of action in terms of making, actually spoils the 
action itself and its true result, the relationship it should have established.” 
 
In constructing people as ‘service users’ we are already to some extent reducing 
their humanity to that of, at best, ‘consumers’ of social work labour. However, as 
Featherstone et al (2014, p.96) remind us “…Arendt identified the treatment of 
humanity as superfluous as beginning whenever people are reduced to a state, 
for example of being homeless or socially burdensome.” There is also a danger 
that in reducing practice to the technical application of tools, we reduce children 
and families to ‘products’ or even ‘consumables’. (Ruch et al, 2010; Garrett, 
2009) 
 
The measurement of social work outcomes seems to me equally problematic. At 
what point can we measure the outcomes of a person’s life – Arendt would say 
only when they are dead (Arendt, 1958, p.192). Others recognize that the 
complexity of the activity that child protection social workers engage in make 
the identification and measurement of outcomes extremely difficult (e.g. 
Forrester et al. 2013). According to Higgins, (2011, p.100) ‘…the frailty of action 
lies in its unpredictability, its irreversibility and its evanescence.”. Human action 
can’t be undone but its meaning will be persistently re-interpreted. In 
‘completing’ a social work assessment and placing it on permanent record we are 
attempting to fix an understanding of the people who are its subjects and then 
formulate a piece of work towards stated outcomes. Assessments conducted 
within the domain of child protection in the current climate tend to focus on ‘risk 
factors’ and plan outcomes that either reduce or remove those risks. 
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Featherstone et al, (2014) see the child-centered risk paradigm as highly 
problematic ethically. They go on to argue that practices rooted in this approach 
are likely to leave children less safe. I agree, for to reduce complex and dynamic 
webs of relationships to a few isolated SMART targets is to fail to recognize, as 
Arendt does, the limits of our abilities to solve equations with too many variables. 
Action is ‘boundless’ and resonates beyond its immediate context (Higgins, 
2011). 
 
Better then to engage in relationships with families that enable us to sustain a 
continually evolving understanding of what is happening and to effect change 
based upon dynamic action within the situation (Hall, 2012). While I might 
disagree with some of the theoretical underpinnings of Ruch et al’s (2010) 
articulation, I fully support theirs and Ferguson’s (2005) assertion that placing 
the relationship at the heart of social work practice enables the worker to move 
beyond surface understandings and is intrinsically valuable as an intervention in 
its own right. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Broadhurst and Mason, (2014) label the ‘informational turn’ as tethering social 
workers to their computer workstations at the expense of investing in the skills 
of direct work with children and families. There has been extensive critique of 
this reduction of social work to labour – feeding the Integrated Children’s System 
(Parton, 2008, White et al, 2008). However, Broadhurst and Mason (2014) feel 
that there is a resurgence of interest in embodied ways of knowing. It seems to 
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me that the argument is a turn away from theoretical and technical rationality 
toward phronêsis, which according to Gillespie (in Dreyfus and Wrathall (2009, 
p.359) was a decisive step in the development of both existentialism and 
phenomenology.  
 
Martinez-Brawley & Mendez – Bonita Zorita (1998) argue that social work 
actions should be guided not by formal theory but a form of reflection that 
generates a unique theory in action, or praxis. Thompson (2005, p.69) similarly 
states “Theory provides us with the cloth from which to tailor our garment, it 
does not provide ‘off the peg’ solutions to practice problems.” My reading of 
Arendt, coupled with my own practice experience leads me to assert that it is 
even more fundamental than that. We weave our own cloth. When engaging with 
a new family who need social work services we pick out the strands relevant to 
the situation drawing from: sociology, psychology, professional and personal 
values, practice experience, intuition, common sense, legislation, policy, 
compassion, control etc. Assessment helps us to determine which strands are 
pertinent to our engagement with these particular service users and analysis 
helps us to decide what to do with which strands; which to pick up, which to 
leave, in which order to put them together. We generate a new understanding 
about each family’s needs and how to help them, aiming to weave particular 
relationships and valuing those relationships for their inherent worth. We need 
theory as a region of thought rather than tool, we need to labour in order to 
maintain the system, we need to work with service users toward their goals but 
ultimately we need to be involved in action with children and families in order to 
enable new meanings to be formed. I fear however, that we will ultimately only 
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be measured by how much we labour. 
 
5685 Words. 
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